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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
ANGELO JOE TELLAY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case 
No. 8731 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 20, 1957, defendant was convicted of 
burglary in the second degree in the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court. He was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
in the State Penitentiary. 
Respondent accepts the statement of facts as sub-
mitted in defendant's brief. There is also presented here-
inafter in this brief the basic facts as proved at trial. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CON-
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VICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF 
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO CON-
VICT THE DEFENDANT OF THE CRIME OF 
BURGLARY IN THE SECOND DEGREE. 
Section 76-9-3, U.C.A. 1953, defines the offense of 
second degree burglary. 
Every person who, in the nighttime, forcibly 
breaks and enters, or without force enters an open 
door, window or other aperture of, any house, 
room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, 
store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse or other building, 
or any tent, vessel, water craft, railroad car, au-
tomobile, automobile trailer, aeroplane or aircraft 
with intent to commit larceny or any felony, is 
guilty of burglary in the second degree. • • • 
The offense of second degree burglary includes the ele-
ment of intent and defendant's appeal is directed solely 
to that element, Yiz., whether there was sufficient evidence 
to prove that defendant committed the acts alleged with 
"• • • intent to commit larceny or any felony, • • •." 
We have no substautial disagreement with appellant 
on matters of law. In a criminal conYiction, each ele-
ment of an offense, including that of intent, must be 
proved beyond a. reasonable doubt. State v. Clark (Utah), 
223 P. 2d 184. The issue here concerns itself with the 
proof of intent. It is a general rule that intent, being a 
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state of mind, is rarely susceptible of direct proof and 
must, therefore, be proved by circumstantial evidence. 
9 Am. J ur. 271, Burglary, Sec. 61 and 12 C.J.S. 731, Bur-
glary, Sec. 55. In State v. Woodruff (1929), 225 N.W. 
254, an Iowa case, the defendant was apprehended inside 
a dwelling house at night. It did not appear that he had 
taken any property. He made no explanation as to the 
reason for his presence in the house. On an appeal by 
the State from a directed verdict for the defendant, the 
Appellate Court reversed. The Court said: 
The general rule is that in the absence of explana-
tion, the jury may infer from the fact of his break-
ing and entering that his intent was to commit lar-
ceny. In ascertaining the intent, the jury may 
take into consideration all the other facts and cir-
cumstances disclosed by the evidence, and bearing 
upon that question. 
See also State v. Maxwell, 42 Iowa 211. 
In Alexander v. State (Texas), 20 S.W. 756, it was 
said: 
Although there was no direct evidence of the in-
tent, it might be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances. The weight to be given these was a 
question properly left to the jury; and when a per-
son enters a building through a window at a late 
hour of the night, after the lights are extinguished, 
and no explanation is given of his intent, it may 
well be inferred that his purpose was to commit 
larceny, such being the usual intent under such cir-
cumstances. 
See also Vickery v. State (1911 Texas), 137 S.W. 687. 
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In a very recent Idaho case, the court commented 
on the proof of intent in a burglary prosecution. Ex Parte 
Seyfried (1953 Idaho), 264 P. 2d 685. A conviction for 
burglary was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court on a writ 
of habeas corpus. The defendant had been apprehended 
at night in the dwelling house of another by police officers. 
He had taken no property when apprehended. He made 
no explanation of his presence in the house. The court 
held that the magistrate was justified in committing the 
defendant for trial and the order quashing the writ and 
remanding the defendant was affirmed. The court said: 
Where a dwelling house is broken and entered in 
the nighttime and no lawful motive or purpose is 
shown or appears, or any satisfactory or reason-
able explanation given for such breaking and en-
tering, the presumption arises that the breaking 
and entering were accomplished with the intent 
to commit larceny. The fact that the officers were 
present and apprehended the burglar before he 
had an opportunity to carry his purpose into exe-
cution is of no importance. The crime of bur-
glary was consummated when the unlawful entry 
was made ·with intent to steal or commit some 
felony therein. Sec.18-1401, I.C. 
The common experiences of mankind raise a 
strong presumption and inference that such a 
breaking and entering as is here shown was made 
with the purpose of committing larceny, no other 
purpose appearing. It is sufficient to show the es-
sential unlawful intent when tl1e entry was made 
by circumstantial evidence. Direct eYidence of such 
i111<'nt is not requirl'd. One's intent may be proved 
by l1is nets and conduct, and such is the usual and 
en stomal')' mode of proving intent. "" • • 
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In an old Utah case, People v. Morton, 1886, 11 P. 
512, this court held that where the facts are such that it 
is impossible to account for the presence of the defend-
ant in the place where he was arrested, unless on the 
hypothesis that he was there to commit larceny, a con-
viction of burglary is justified. 
With the foregoing rules in mind, we proceed to 
consider appellant's contention, which will be discussed 
in two phases, first, since the evidence is largely circum-
stantial, does that circumstantial evidence prove i!)j;ent 
and, second, was there evidence that defendant was intoxi-
cated to the extent that he could not form the requisite 
intent? 
There was sufficient proof of defendant's intent as 
required by the statute. There was no direct proof of 
intent, as is the usual case in burglary prosecutions, but 
the basic circumstantial evidence as proved raises the pre-
sumption of intent. That presumption was not rebutted 
at the trial. The following facts were proved: 
(1) That a window was broken out of the building (a 
foundry business building) on the night of the 
entry. 
(2) That police officers, called to the scene by a night 
watchman, heard a pounding noise on the inside 
of a set of double doors and afterwards, upon in-
spection, it was found that the locks to the doors 
had been broken. 
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(3) That almost immediately after the pounding 
noise ceased the defendant climbed out of the 
broken window space. 
( 4) That the entry occurred at night, at about 
10:30 p.m. 
( 5) That defendant had no permission to enter the 
building. 
(6) That no explanation was made as to the reason 
for defendant's presence in the building. 
(7) That defendant, when apprehended, had appar-
ently taken no property. 
In addition to the above, the defendant made certain 
admissions tending to show a felonious intent. (See pages 
71, 72 and 79 of the Trial Record.) Officer Clayton testi-
fied that "--Tellay; he stated that he was sorry that the 
other guys got messed up. Then he asked the girl why 
she didn't take off--." "--and she says that she 
didn't want to leaYe him there to take the rap, and he 
says, well, you should haYe ; .. . "Then, he asked why she 
didn't let him know the police w-ere there ahead of 
time, • • •. '' See Trial Record, pages 71 and 72. Officer 
Kt'lmC'th PPek testified tha.t at the jail, after booking the 
defendant, the latter asked him wh~- the rest of them had 
to be atTPsted, that it wasn't any of their doings, it was 
just him. See Trial Record, page 79. 
There was no evidence submitted to show that de-
fendant was so intoxicated that he was incapable of form-
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ing an intent to commit larceny or another felony. Three 
police officers who were on the scene and who apprehend-
ed the defendant testified that in their opinion he was not 
drunk. They testified variously that he spoke ''plainly'' 
and did not have difficulty understanding; that his move-
ments were steady and that he had "full capabilities." 
See Trial Record, pages 51, 57, 59, 60 and 71. One officer 
testified in fact that he could not tell that the defendant 
had been drinking. See Trial Record, page 59. There 
was testimony by witnesses for the defense that the de-
fendant had been drinking but none of them stated that 
the defendant was intoxicated or drunk. Counsel for de-
fendant laid great stress on the fact that the broken win-
dow space was small and that there was a certain amount 
of jagged glass remaining in it, and yet it was testified 
by several of the witnesses that they observed the de-
fendant climb out of the window. This act obviously re-
quired a reasonable degree of agility and steadiness. 
Considering the evidence adduced, there is no other 
reasonable hypothesis which the jury could have found. 
No explanation was made why defendant was in this 
building at a late hour. Appellant, in his conclusion, 
suggests four hypotheses, any of which he claims might 
account for defendant's actions. Under the facts of the 
case they are not reasonable, nor were they suggested 
by the evidence at trial. First, a person would not rea-
sonably break a window and climb into a strange build-
ing merely for the purpose of escaping his wife, even 
supposing a wife of such annoying and dangerous char-
acteristics. Why not run from her or hide in less difficult 
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seclusion~ It is noted that one of the defendant's wit-
nesses, in fact, testified that when last seen by her, de-
fendant was chasing his wife. See Trial Record, page 92. 
The hypothesis and the evidence are not consistent. There 
was other evidence that the wife had on previous occa-
sions called the police because of defendant's conduct. 
This certainly does not seem consistent with a theory that 
the husband was running to escape the wife. Second, again 
there was no evidence that defendant was intoxicated. 
Third, there was no evidence that the defendant desired 
to seclude himself from the rest of the party as is sug-
gested, and even if so, why pick such a difficult and 
unusual hiding place f Fourth, if defendant desired to 
use a toilet, a circumstance about which nothing was said 
at the trial, why break a window and climb into a strange 
building? It was night and it would seem that a person 
could more easily seclude himself for such a temporary 
necessity. 
CO~CLUSIOX 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
E. R. C~\LLISTER 
Attorney General 
GARY L. THEURER 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Responden.t 
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